Germany, "a spirit of conquest in all directions through the people, bred, or at least nurtured, by the great military conquest of the Franco-German War."

Notwithstanding—as some would say, but, as it appears to us, quite consistently with—all these admissions, Professor Taussig adheres firmly to the principle of Free Trade. He has no sympathy for the "pseudo-judicial attitude" of those who are for judging each particular case on its merits, without any presumption in favour of Free Trade rather than Protection. Such writers are justly suspected of "inability or unwillingness to follow the threads of intricate reasoning." This rejection of general principle is the less excusable in the case of international trade, as that theory has received and required little modification. "The edifice of which the foundation was laid by Adam Smith and his contemporaries and which was further built up by Ricardo, senior, and the younger Mill, remains substantially as it was put together by these ancient worthies." . . . "That theory in its essentials holds its own without a serious rival." The application is doubtless not so easy and simple as was thought by the economists of half a century ago. But "the fundamental principle of Free Trade has been little shaken."


Henry Sidgwick is remembered by economists as one who shed light upon their science not only directly, but also by reflection from other worlds of thought. In respect of this double service he may be compared with several of his predecessors in that illustrious line of English philosophy which he worthily continued. What he says of J. S. Mill as an economist is true of himself:—"He brought a higher degree of philosophical reflection to bear upon his exposition of the common doctrines of the science."

Among passages in the book before us which refer to Sidgwick's purely economic studies the following appears particularly interesting:—

"I have been reading all kinds of things lately. I find out that political economy is what I really enjoy as an intellectual exercise. It is just at the right stage of scientific progress and there are not too many facts to be got up."

We forbear to expatiate on the reflections which this confession
suggests—how much can be effected by "intellectual exercise," without "too many facts," in the way of clearing away the illusions which beset our subject; how little in the way of concrete constructions on the site thus cleared; whether many students can be expected to "get up" more facts than sufficed Sidgwick.

Sidgwick wielded the purely deductive organism with considerable power. But he especially excelled in handling what he called the "Art of Political Economy." This part of his economic treatise, the great Third Book, is much indebted to his ethical philosophy. From the Methods of Ethics is borrowed the dialectic by which it is concluded that the principle of Distributive Justice affords no certain sound, no clear direction, unless it is informed by the superior principle of Greatest Happiness. The Methods of Ethics are also required in order to interpret the utilitarian first principle: to exhibit the implication that the sum-total of happiness is increased by increasing the number of a prosperous population, and the \textit{prima facie} presumption in favour of equally distributing the means of happiness—a presumption limited by laws of human nature very general and deep-seated. These sublime topics are not explicitly rehandled in the Memoir. But if we obtain no further guidance in the arduous region of first principles, still our confidence in the guide is increased. The life of the philosopher is calculated to add authority to his teaching. We do not profess to analyse philosophically the grounds of such authority. The reader may be referred to the paper printed in an appendix to the Memoir, in which Sidgwick has discussed Authority as a source of belief. Perhaps the sources of primary belief are described more justly than philosophers are ready to admit in the lines "which occurred to Sidgwick in sleep, or which at least he awoke thinking of," beginning, "We think so because other people all think so," and continuing, "or because we were told so and think we must think so." However that may be, it is safe to say that the perusal of this well-composed narrative and well-compiled correspondence will deepen in many minds their respect for the judgment of Sidgwick. Memoirs of great teachers or preachers sometimes counteract the effect of their writings, by the exhibition of pottiness in private life. But Sidgwick sustains our respect by a certain elevation of mind, the quality which he himself describes when, with reference to "reading and thinking," and "the ultimate good to be derived in indirect ways" from mental cultivation, he says (p. 148)—

"This world, our little petty interests, are 'too much with us,'"
and anything that lifts us out of them is a gain. Indeed, I estimate
men a good deal by their capacity for this elevation, "soaring."

His friends and the readers of his life may say of him what
he says of a lost friend:—

"I never knew any one more free from what Goethe calls 'was
un alle bandigt das Gemeine.' After conversing with him I always
felt that the great realities of Life and Thought and Art, the true
concerns of the human spirit, became more real and fresh and
vivid to me."

Those whose study of Sidgwick is confined to his philosophical
writings may fail to realise how deeply his thought was tinctured
with the wisdom which is diffused through literature, how
diligently he studied human nature in the school of those masters
who, in the phrase of one of them, are better teachers of conduct
than "Chrysippus and Crantor." Sidgwick's sympathetic
interest in everything human extended even to the antiquities
of economic history. We shall not attempt—it would be out of
place here—to portray the varied talents and virtues which,
known already to the reader and the friends of Sidgwick, awake
new admiration as reproduced in this Memoir. But we have
thought it not irrelevant to adduce some illustrations of the
encomium which has already been pronounced in the Economic
Journal by the very competent judge who wrote the obituary
notice of Sidgwick. In that appreciative study Mr. Keynes
sums up his impressions by "saying that he regards Professor
Sidgwick not merely as the most intellectually gifted man he has
ever met, but also as pre-eminently realising Aristotle's concep-
tion of the φαινομεν, the impersonation of the standard of reason."

That Aristotelian character, it will be remembered, is the one of
which it is written that we ought to defer even to the underdemo-
strated dicta and opinions of the wise, who have a power of
mental vision acquired by experience.

A conspicuous feature in Sidgwick's philosophy was the
blending of practical wisdom with speculative doubt. He who
reduced so many provinces of conduct under the sovereignty of
the Utilitarian first principle still hesitated to complete the uni-
fication. It appears from the Memoir that this speculative doubt
was never removed. We are here not entirely unconcerned with
this scruple about first principles, so far as the Art of Political
Economy involves the postulate that

"The ultimate criterion of the actions of government generally
is their tendency to increase human happiness" (Sidgwick, Politics,
ch. iii. § 3).
But let it be granted that conduciveness to general happiness is the end of political action; that in choosing between alternative policies the main question before the political economist is, which "may be expected to lead to most happiness so far as this depends on the production and distribution of the produce of industry?" (Political Economy, Book III, ch. vii. § 1).

There still may be hesitation as to the means conducing to that end. For "we can no longer use the comparatively exact measurements of economic science, but only those more vague and uncertain balancings of different quantities with which the politician has to content himself" (ibid., ch. i. § 1).

Again and again, as each practical problem comes up for consideration, Sidgwick insists on this limitation of our faculties:

"There is, I think, no theoretical solution; it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise" (ibid., ch. ii. § 2).

"It seems hardly possible to frame the regulations on any other principle than that of carefully balancing opposite expediencies" (ibid., § 6).

Other philosophers formally admit, but are apt to forget in practice, that probability is the guide of life. To follow the better course and yet continue to see the indications which pointed in other directions was the peculiar virtue of Sidgwick. The editors' testimony as to this peculiarity—the testimony of a brother and a wife—deserves attention.

"He always had a vivid perception of the other side of a question, and was eager to take into account what was valid in an opponent's position, so that in practical affairs he generally acted consciously on a balance of advantages, not on any overpowering conviction that the course he adopted must certainly be right; there was no element of fanaticalism in anything he did, and his temperament was not a sanguine one. The result was not indecisiveness in action. When he took up any matter—for instance, the education of women—he worked at it with a deliberate zeal and an unwavering, single-minded, self-devotion, which made up for lack of enthusiastic and unhesitating conviction; but he worked without the stimulus which this gives; and perhaps his balanced temperament prevented his being a very inspiring leader, except to those who knew him well."

Sidgwick's scepticism has more than once taken the form of refusing to submit to a general rule which purports to render the appeal to experience superfluous. Of this character is the limitation which he imposes on the principle of laissez-faire. Limitation we say advisedly, not abrogation, of the general principle, to which he still leaves considerable authority.
"This conception of the single force of self-interest, creating and keeping in true economic order the vast and complex fabric of social industry, is very fascinating. . . . And I believe that the conception contains a very large element of truth" (Political Economy, Bk. II. ch. ii. § 1).

So with respect to one particularly important infraction of laissez-faire, protection of nativo industry, we read:—

"I do not mean to say that the broad general argument for industrial liberty has lost its force. I have already expressed the contrary opinion, but I think that in the natural development of economic theory it has come to be recognised as merely a first approximation to the truth" (Political Economy, Bk. III. ch. v. § 1).

The main consideration which turned the balance in Sidgwick's judgment, making him "decidedly opposed" to the policy of Protection, is thus expressed:—

"I do not think we can reasonably expect our actual governments to be wise and strong enough to keep their protective interference within due limits" (ibid. We have not room for the corroborating context).

It may be asked now: Does Sidgwick hold the balance fairly between general and specific evidence when the two conflict? Some prejudice may perhaps be excited by his procedure in a case which is somewhat parallel, though in aliis materialibus, his investigation of spiritualistic phenomena. He may seem ready to admit shreds of evidence in defiance of common sense. The Memoir certainly shows him pursuing "psychical research" more persistently than might have been expected; but it also shows that he was by no means deficient in what Gibbon, with reference to a well-attested marvel, calls a "general antidote" against credulity. Altogether, on the question, which does not admit of a precise answer, what comparative weight should be assigned to particular pieces of evidence and to experience massed in generalisations, it would be hard to show that Sidgwick deviated from the standard of reason. The refined argument that "temporary protection is in certain cases defensible in pure economic theory" (loc. cit.) is far removed from vulgar fallacies; a philosophical curiosity about telepathy and hypnotism does not imply belief in popular superstitions and the common ghost.

All that we learn about the personality of Sidgwick confirms our deference to his practical wisdom. A peculiar weight attaches to his judgments on the human side of economic problems. He teaches with authority that the Art of Political Economy aims at a maximum of happiness, by means in the choice of which
we have often to be content with a balance of probabilities. Whenever he himself strikes the balance he thereby contributes a datum of some moment to the deliberations of his followers. Great weight accords to the scales which preponderate in the well-balanced mind of Sidgwick.


M. de Foville has a great advantage over most writers on this subject, in having a practical knowledge of it. He has studied Money as Director of the French Mint. The subject had indeed engaged his attention before his appointment to that office, in 1893. He had already computed the amount of money circulating in France by a method which was discussed in the _Economic Journal_ in 1892 (p. 109). It may be interesting to record here some of the results obtained by the latest application of that method. In 1903 the total value of the gold money in France (including foreign coins) was 4,800,000,000 francs; that of silver (at its "par," or nominal value) not so much as half this sum. Since 1903 additions have been made to the gold currency, but M. de Foville doubts whether it has been brought up to half the total amount of gold coin issued from the French Mint since the year 1795, a total of some 10,000,000,000 francs. We infer that the gold currency in France now amounts to about £200,000,000. Comparing this stock with that of other countries, M. de Foville accepts as "not improbable" the estimate of the American statisticians that the monetary stock of the world amounts to thirty-one milliards of gold and sixteen milliards of silver (say £1,240,000,000 and £640,000,000 respectively). The amount of gold—whether as money or in some other form—existing in the civilised world, he estimates at not more than forty milliards, that of silver at not more than thirty milliards. A useful summary of the monetary regulations prevailing in the different countries of the world is given in one of the descriptive chapters. We may also mention particularly the chapter in which the various operations by which an ingot is transformed into coins, are vividly, we had almost said visibly, set forth. In the description of monetary technicalities, M. de Foville has among economists only one rival, Jevons, who had been an official of the