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Unionists who, as advertised by the publishers, have already bought up 19,000 copies of the History, will endeavour to "hear the other side" presented by historians comparable with our gifted authors in diligence and talent and the art of persuasion. Writers who fulfil these conditions are, indeed, not easily to be found.

The Economic Causes of War. By Achille Loria. Translated by John Leslie Garner. (Chicago; Kerr. 1918. Pp. 188.)

THE first edition of this book was published in 1912 under the title Les Bases Économiques de la Justice Internationale. It was reviewed by Mr. Norman Angell in the ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1913. A further notice is now called for by the addition of a substantial supplement on The Lessons of the Great War. The translator has adopted a title appropriate to the present form of the work. Indeed, the original title was not well adapted even to the first edition. The contents would have been better indicated by the title which Mr. Norman Angell suggested: The Operation of Economic Factors in the Evolution of International Society. In that evolution as conceived by Professor Loria there are three stages. First, economic relations give rise to international law. At a later stage international law breaks down under the strain of opposed interests; and still later it is rebuilt by economic influences. It is with the second and third stages that we are here concerned. The newly added supplement purports to be a verification of certain generalisations relating to those stages.

The thesis that wars are wholly due to economic causes has one of its ablest advocates in Professor Loria. It is impossible within our limits to do justice to the learning with which he supports this thesis. It must suffice to cite some of the instances on which he relies. "Most of the wars of Athens were caused by the necessity of securing additional lands." "In Rome the Third Punic War was merely a revolt of Latin property, determined to repair its diminished revenues." "The sole purpose of the Crusades was to increase the income of European feudal lords at the expense of the Syrian or Oriental revenue." "The struggles of Pisa and Florence, the Italian wars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were due to economic causes." "Holland's struggle for independence against Spain was in reality simply a privateering war on the Spanish merchant marine and the Hispano-American colonial trade." "The war of England against

Napoleon was merely a reaction against the Napoleonic conquests, which threatened British commerce." If the adverb "simply" and its equivalents were omitted, these propositions would appear less *simpliste*.

As the ancients attributed destruction and preservation to the same Power, so Professor Loria teaches that economic action, which at one stage is the sole cause of war, tends, at another stage, in various ways to establish peace. One way is presented by the analogy between industrial and international disputes. Workmen will accept an arbitrated decision even when it grants them an increase of wages less than what they might have secured by fighting, less by an amount less than the cost of fighting. Similarly "if the demands of the stronger State are represented by 1,000, and it appears to be in a position to obtain this by means of a war whose cost may be represented by 100, the arbitrators must allow him (sic) 900+d; but if the cost of the war would be 300 (we omit some decimals) the arbitrators may grant him 700+dwithout any fear that the stronger State will reject the arbitrated award." Whence it follows that with the increasing cost of war the concession which must be made to force becomes smaller. The "zone of arbitration," in Professor Pigou's phrase, becomes smaller. Professor Loria has expressed with great clearness a conception which Professor Pigou had introduced (in his Industrial Peace, 1905) in a mathematical form. The conception has been employed by the present writer (in 1915) without acknowledgment, because without knowledge, of Professor Loria's work. We have not space to quote the passages which show that Professor Loria has a just sense of the differences as well as of the similarities between industrial and international disputes. (See his pages 151, 152, 154, 157.)

Among other ways in which economic influences tend to minimise war the "internationalisation of the Labour movement" is emphasised. There will arise among workmen of different nations "a solidarity which will constitute the strongest guarantee for international peace." But the author does not predict the total cessation of war—at least, while the present capitalistic system, with its so-called "forced association of labour" (pp. 132, 162, 179), perniciously persists.

Such are some of the generalisations which it is the purport of the new supplement to test. As to the economic origin of war, the writer finds that the statements made by him in 1912 have been confirmed by subsequent events. The Balkan war was fomented by foreign manufacturers of armaments. "Serbian

pork, Bulgarian wheat, and Greek commerce were the factors underlying the great and so-called religious movement against the Moslem." As to the European war, "the desire to find a lucrative employment for capital in new countries was the real underlying cause of the horrible conflagration," as pointed out by the Economist (November 1915). The testimony of Mr. Brailsford, of Pope Pius X., and other authorities to the same effect is cited. The author appears to attribute economic motives to the belligerents on both sides indiscriminately. He wrote his Supplement before the Americans came into the war, otherwise he would probably have adduced the Crusaders of the twentieth century as verifying his thesis: the sole motive for their intervention the desire for wealth! But perhaps the thesis does not imply that all parties to a war on both sides are actuated solely by economic motives. We think that this implication, if not intended, should have been more explicitly disowned.

With regard to the deterrent effect of anticipated cost, Professor Loria dwells on the fact that the cost of the War has far exceeded the expectations of M. Bloch and other prophets. Yet, contrary to their expectations, the warring nations have not been soon exhausted. The enormous cost is, indeed, such as not to afford much prospect of "net gain" to belligerents, even if victorious, in future wars. Yet we may suggest that the difficulty of prediction evidenced by the anticipations about the present war is favourable to the spirit of gambling rather than the cool calculations of economic men.

How about the solidarity between workmen of different nations as a guarantee for peace! What of the German Socialists enthusiastically voting military credits, eagerly supporting a war of conquest! "The refutation of the theory," replies our author, "is merely one of appearance. For a long time the Socialist party in Germany—the same, moreover, as in other countries—has been anything but an expression of the wishes and interests of the proletariat; it has become the fief of certain party leaders . . . in other words, of a dissatisfied clique of the bourgeoisie who are adepts in securing snug incomes for themselves at the expense of their flocks." . . . "Projects for perpetual peace will be unrealisable Utopias until the artificial democracy by which we are ruled is displaced by a true democracy, an actual government by the people. . . . If the sceptre had passed to the costermongers, to the peasants, to the market women, we would have been spared this brutal carnage." So the Bolsheviks seem to have thought. Are they a "true democracy"?