Major Works of Michael Maschler

• "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games", with R.J. Maschler, 1964, in Advances in Game Theory,
• "The Core of a Cooperative Game", with M. Davis, 1965, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
• "Game-Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament", with R.J. Aumann, 1966, Mathematica
• "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle" with R.J. Aumann, 1972, Management Science.
• "An Advantage of the Bargaining Set over the Core", 1976, JET
• "Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus and Related Solution Concepts", with B. Peleg and L.S. Shapley, 1979, Mathematics of Operations Research
• "Superadditive Solution for the Nash bargaining Game", with M. Perles, 1981, IJGT
• "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", with R.J. Aumann, 1985, JET.
• "The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games", with G. Owen, 1989, IJGT
• "The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments", with G. Owen, 1992, in Selten, editor, Rational Interaction
• "The Bargaining Set, Kernel and Nucleolus", 1992, in Aumann and Hart, editors, Handbook of Game Theory
• Repeated Games of Incomplete Information with R.J. Aumann, 1995.

Resources on  Michael Maschler

• "Michael Maschler, in memorium" by R.J. Aumann et al, [pdf]
• Maschler page at Hebrew University
• Wikipedia